Computer Security Articles
Academic Papers
Introduction to the Second Edition of Secrets and Lies
Information Security Magazine Point-Counterpoints
Chinese Cyberattacks: Myth or Menace? (Jul 08)
The Ethics of Vulnerability Research (May 08)
Consolidation: Plague or Progress (Mar 08)
Caution: Turbulence Ahead (Dec 07)
Cyberwar: Myth or Reality? (Nov 07)
Home Users: A Public Health Problem? (Sep 07)
Is Big Brother a Big Deal? (May 07)
Is Penetration Testing Worth It? (Mar 07)
Does Secrecy Help Protect Personal Information? (Jan 07)
Do Federal Security Regulations Help? (Nov 06)
Is There Strategic Software? (Sep 06)
Are Security Certifications Valuable? (Jul 06)
Is User Education Working? (Apr 06)
IEEE Security & Privacy Columns
How the Human Brain Buys Security (Jul/Aug 08)
The Death of the Security Industry (Nov/Dec 07)
The Zotob Storm (Nov/Dec 05)
University Networks and Data Security (Sep/Oct 05)
Authentication and Expiration (Jan/Feb 05)
SIMS: Solution, or Part of the Problem? (Sep/Oct 04)
Customers, Passwords, and Web Sites (Jul/Aug 04)
Security and Compliance (May/Jun 04)
Voting Security (Jan/Feb 04)
Airplane Hackers (Nov/Dec 03)
The Speed of Security (Jul/Aug 03)
Guilty Until Proven Innocent? (May/Jun 03)
Locks and Full Disclosure (Mar/Apr 03)
We Are All Security Consumers (Jan/Feb 03)
Cryptography: The Importance of Not Being Different (Mar 99)
Communications of the ACM Columns
Psychology of Security (May 07)
Two-Factor Authentication: Too Little, Too Late (Apr 05)
Insider Risks in Elections (Jul 04)
Cyber Underwriters Lab? (Apr 04)
Risks of PKI: Electronic Commerce (Feb 04)
Risks of PKI: Secure E-Mail (Jan 04)
Insurance and the Computer Industry (Mar 01)
Risks of Relying on Cryptography (Oct 99)
The Trojan Horse Race (Sep 99)
Biometrics: Uses and Abuses (Aug 99)
eWeek Articles
Digital Information Rights Need Tech-Savvy Courts (Feb 14 05)
Desktop Google Finds Holes (Nov 29 04)
We Owe Much to DES (Aug 30 04)
US-VISIT Is No Bargain (Jul 6 04)
Computerworld Articles
The curse of the secret question (Feb 09 05)
Information security: How liable should vendors be? (Oct 28 04)
Cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA: Time for a New Standard (Aug 19 04)
The Witty worm: A New Chapter in Malware (Jun 2 04)
Why Computers are Insecure (Nov 99)
CNET News.com Articles
Who says safe computing must remain a pipe dream? (Dec 9 04)
Saluting the data encryption legacy (Sep 27 04)
Internet Worms and Critical Infrastructure (Dec 9 03)
Trust, but Verify, Microsoft's Pledge (Jan 18 02)
Information Security Magazine Columns
The Insurance Takeover (Feb 01)
The Fallacy of Trusted Client Software (Aug 00)
The Process of Security (Apr 00)
1999 Crypto Year-in-Review (Dec 99)
A Plea for Simplicity (Nov 99)
International Cryptography (Sep 99)
1998 Crypto Year-in-Review (Dec 98)
Key Recovery (Oct 98)
Other Articles
The Problem Is Information Insecurity
Security Watch, August 10, 2008
Information security isn't a technological problem. It's an economics problem.
Secret Questions Blow a Hole in Security
ComputerWeekly, April 4, 2008
It's a mystery to me why websites think "secret questions" are a good idea.
Information Security and Externalities
ENISA Quarterly, January 2007
Information insecurity is costing us billions. We pay for the lack of security, year after year.
Schneier: Full Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities a 'Damned Good Idea'
CSO Online, January 2007
Full disclosure—the practice of making the details of security vulnerabilities public—is a damned good idea. Public scrutiny is the only reliable way to improve security, while secrecy only makes us less secure.
Security in the Cloud (Feb 06)
Network World, February 15, 2006
One of the basic philosophies of security is defense in depth: overlapping systems designed to provide security even if one of them fails. An example is a firewall coupled with an intrusion-detection system (IDS). Defense in depth provides security, because there's no single point of failure and no assumed single vector for attacks.
The Hackers are Coming!
Utility Automation & Engineering T&D, December 13, 2005
Over the past few years, we have seen hacking transform from a hobbyist activity to a criminal one. Hobbyist threats included defacing web pages, releasing worms that did damage, and running denial-of-service attacks against major networks. The goal was fun, notoriety, or just plain malice.
Attack Trends: 2004 and 2005
Queue, June 2, 2005
Counterpane Internet Security Inc. monitors more than 450 networks in 35 countries, in every time zone. In 2004 we saw 523 billion network events, and our analysts investigated 648,000 security "tickets." What follows is an overview of what's happening on the Internet right now, and what we expect to happen in the coming months.
Microsoft's Actions Speak Louder Than Words
Network World, May 31, 2004
The security of your computer and network depends on two things: what you do to secure your computer and network, and what everyone else does to secure their computers and networks.
Security Pitfalls in Cryptography
Strong cryptography is very powerful when it is done right, but it is not a panacea. Focusing on the cryptographic algorithms while ignoring other aspects of security is like defending your house not by building a fence around it, but by putting an immense stake into the ground and hoping that the adversary runs right into it.
Why Cryptography is Harder than it Looks
The cryptography now on the market doesn't provide the level of security it advertises. Most systems are not designed and implemented in concert with cryptographers, but by engineers who thought of cryptography as just another component. It's not. You can't make systems secure by tacking on cryptography as an afterthought. You have to know what you are doing every step of the way, from conception through installation.
Cryptography, Security, and the Future
Present-day computer security is a house of cards; it may stand for now, but it can't last. Many insecure products have not yet been broken because they are still in their infancy. But when these products are widely used, they will become tempting targets for criminals. The press will publicize the attacks, undermining public confidence in these systems. Ultimately, products will win or lose in the marketplace depending on the strength of their security.
Self-Study Course in Block Cipher Cryptanalysis
Studying cryptanalysis is difficult because there is no standard textbook, and no way of knowing which cryptanalytic problems are suitable for different levels of students. This paper attempts to organize the existing literature of block-cipher cryptanalysis in a way that students can use to learn cryptanalytic techniques and ways to break new algorithms.
How to Evaluate Security Technology
Cryptography has the potential of transforming the Internet, or any network, from an academic toy into a real business tool. It does so by allowing us to do real business -- for example, signing and enforcing contracts or doing e-commerce. Unfortunately, most of the products out there aren't very good. They have problems, they're broken. Most cryptography in these products doesn't perform as advertised. The article discusses why this happens, what you should watch out for, and what can be done to change the situation.
Ten Risks of PKI
Public-key infrastructure has been oversold as the answer to many network security problems. We discuss the problems that PKI doesn't solve, and that PKI vendors don't like to mention.
The Case for Outsourcing Security
Deciding to outsource network security is difficult. The stakes are high, so it's no wonder that paralysis is a common reaction when contemplating whether to outsource or not.
Click here to bring down the Internet
In recent Congressional testimony, hackers from the L0pht boasted that they could bring down the Internet in under 30 minutes. Should we be concerned?
DVD Encryption Broken
ZDNet, November 1999
Web-Based Encrypted E-Mail
ZDNet, August 1999
NIST AES News
ZDNet, August 1999
Why the Worst Cryptography is in the Systems that Pass Initial Analysis
Information Security Magazine, March 1999
Intel's Processor ID
ZDNet, January 26, 1999
up to Essays and Op Eds
Schneier.com is a personal website. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of BT.
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